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The Meaning of Just Cause in North Carolina
Public Employment Law: Carroll and its
Progeny Provide for a Heightened Multifactor
Standard for State Employee Disciplinary Cases
J. MICHAEL MCGUINNESS*
Just cause, like justice itself, is not susceptible of precise definition ....
It is a flexible concept, embodying notions of equity and fairness, that
can only be determined upon an examination of the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.'
[Tihe disciplinary action taken [must be] 'just.' Inevitably, this inquiry
requires an irreducible act of judgment that cannot always be satisfied by
the mechanical application of rules and regulations.'
1.

INTRODUCTION

North Carolina state employees serve as an enormously important
part of our democratic system of government.' Over ninety thousand
state employees carry out the functions of North Carolina government.'
* This Author has represented public employees for over twenty years in all types
He can be contacted at:
of personnel disputes and employment litigation.
jmichael@mcguinnesslaw.com, 910-862-7087. He represented Officer Clifton Carroll
throughout the six-year case discussed at length in this Article. See N.C. Dep't of Env't
& Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 2004). This Article is dedicated to
Officer Carroll, who enjoyed a distinguished law enforcement career and made life better
for his colleague state employees. Special thanks are extended to Travis Payne for his

contributions to the study and practice of just cause issues.
1. Id. at 900.
2. Id.
3. As of April 2010, the State of North Carolina had 93,217 full-time, permanent,
state employees. North Carolina Government Workforce Statistics, N.C. OFFICE OF STATE
PERSONNEL,

http://www.osp.state.nc.us/data/stats/start.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).

Recent developments in several states including Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, New Jersey,
and California reveal how job security issues for state employees have become high
profile disputes capturing national headlines. See, e.g., Adam Sorenson, What Wisconsin
Has Wrought: Labor Unrest Spreads, TIME, February 23, 2011; Erin McPike, Union
Disputes Spread To Indiana, Ohio, TIME, February 22, 2011; Michael Shear, Politics of
Wisconsin Labor Fight Spread To Washington, N.Y. TIMES, February 18, 2011.
4. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE PERSONNEL, supra note 3.
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The services provided by state employees represent a significant
component of the entire management of state government. The day-today operation of North Carolina government is essentially dependent
upon the service of state employees.
Unfortunately, North Carolina state employees are subject to a
broad range of legal and employment risks as a result of their state
service.' Serving as a state employee thrusts one into a dangerous world
of endless investigations, accusations, media scrutiny, and potential
discipline, often triggered by the complaints of unsatisfied "customers."
Supervisors often demand perfection in performance and conduct,
both on and off-duty. Taxpayers are often quick to take out their
frustrations on state employees who are hardly to blame for the many
problems facing North Carolina. These state employees frequently are
accused of conduct, performance, and other policy violations. These
legal risks to state employees have substantially increased in recent
years.6
The most minor alleged infractions can invoke substantial
investigation and the risk of severe discipline, including termination.
Discipline for unacceptable personal conduct can be imposed without
warning and can be premised upon a single incident as long as the
conduct is sufficiently severe that it rises to the level required for "just
cause."' Fortunately, the State Personnel Act provides insulation from
discipline without just cause for career state employees.' This just cause
standard is essentially one of the few general barriers separating career
state employees from the unemployment line, and its application and
interpretation is the subject of this Article.
The body of public employment law governing North Carolina state
employees consists of layers of federal and state constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, and common law.9 The just cause principle is one of the

5. See cases cited infra note 29.
6. See cases cited infra note 29.
7. See 25 N.C. ADMIN CODE 1J.0604, .0608, .0614 (2011); Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888.
8. Under the State Personnel Act, just cause protection is only available for career
employees who have completed twenty-four months of continuous state employment
service. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-1.1, -35.
9. The United States Constitution affords protections against various types of
retaliatory, arbitrary, or discriminatory employment actions. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1,
XIV; id. art. I, H§ 1, 14, 19, 35, 36. The State Personnel Act and other legislation
provides statutory rights for employees as well. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.1 (Equal
Employment Practices Act). Title 25 of the North Carolina Administrative Code
provides various procedural and substantive regulations in part governing state employee
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general core principles in the arsenal of protections for career state
employees. State personnel disputes often present serious challenges to
employees trying to survive in a potential minefield of traps where a
single false or unsupported complaint can begin years of investigation
and, ultimately, discipline.
This Article explores the doctrine of just cause in North Carolina
public employment law. After a review of the leading North Carolina
Supreme Court case of N.C. Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Carroll'o and its progeny, this Article examines applicable
just cause standards and analytical tests so that the true meaning of just
cause can be better understood. Multi-factor tests are applied in order to
employ a more objective just cause standard and to avoid unprincipled
conclusions not founded upon established criteria.
11.

SOURCES OF PROTECTION FOR STATE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE STATE
PERSONNEL ACT

Although many other state and federal employment laws apply to
the protection of state employees in specific contexts, the State
Personnel Act is a fundamental statutory scheme which grants a number
of specific rights to covered state employees." There are also a number
of state promulgated regulations which further define related state
personnel issues and standards."
The State Personnel Act provides protection from various types of
injuries, including retaliation, discrimination, and adverse actions that
occur without just cause.13 The North Carolina Whistleblower Act
provides judicial remedies for state employee whistleblowers who report
The North Carolina Constitution
various types of wrongdoing."
likewise affords broad remedies to state employees."
personnel matters. State employees also enjoy various common law claims under the
State Tort Claims Act. Id. §§ 143-291 to 300.1a.
10. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 2004).
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126.
12. See 25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-34.1.
14. Id. § 126-84 to -87; see also Newberne v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 618
S.E.2d 201, 211-12 (N.C. 2005).
15. Although a thorough review of state constitutional law is beyond the scope of
this Article, there is promising hope for state employees pursuing state constitutional
claims. For example, in Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), the
North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized disparate treatment claims in a personnel
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The enforcement mechanism for these varied regulations is
provided by the Administrative Procedures Act." The North Carolina
State Personnel Commission hears state personnel cases, usually
following a hearing and a recommended decision by an administrative
law judge ("ALJ")."
Section 126-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes identifies
which employees are subject to the State Personnel Act." The statute
contains a lengthy list of exemptions and exceptions. Career state
employees, as defined in section 126-1.1, are protected by the State
Personnel Act.'9 A career state employee, for purposes of being entitled
to just cause protection, must have been continuously employed by the
state in a position subject to the State Personnel Act, for the immediately
preceding twenty-four months.
The State Personnel Act provides the procedure for grievance
Generally, this requires any
appeals for career state employees.
employee having a grievance arising out of his employment that does not
involve discrimination to follow the grievance procedure established by
his or her department or agency. 21 Employees therefore must exhaust
their grievance and internal agency appeals.22 Section 126-34.1 identifies
the various grounds for contested cases under the State Personnel Act.23
A state employee may file a contested case petition in the Office of
Administrative Hearings to challenge eleven specified types of injuries.

dispute involving a former state employee, Algie Toomer. See infra text accompanying
notes 236-40; see also J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of North Carolina
ConstitutionalProtection In The New Millenium, 27 CAMPBELLL. REV. 223 (2005).
16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150(B); see also Julian Mann, Administrative justice: No
LongerJustA Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2001).
17. The powers and duties of the State Personnel Commission are set forth in section
126-4. Id. § 126-4. The commission is authorized to establish policies and rules
governing a wide range of state employment issues including but not limited to the
appointment, promotion, transfer, demotion, suspension, and separation of employees.
Id. The Office of Administrative Hearings is comprised of ALJs who hear cases under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See id. § 150(B). Most of the ALJs have vast experience
and expertise in adjudicating just cause and other state personnel cases, and are widely
recognized as affording fair hearings.
18. Id. § 126-5.
19. See id. § 126-1.1.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 126-34.
22. Id.
23. See id. § 126-34.1.
24. Id.
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Perhaps the most common form of state employment dispute is
whether there is just cause for discipline. Section 126-35 precludes
certain discipline without just cause. 25 Section 126-35(d) places the
burden of proof upon the employer to prove just cause for discipline.26
Any just cause dispute requires a two-part inquiry: (1) "whether the
employee engaged in the alleged conduct," and (2) "whether that
conduct constitutes just cause for the disciplinary action taken."2
Ultimately, discipline for career state employees is justified when the
employer can prove the particular level of just cause required to justify
the discipline imposed. 8
Ill. THE GROWING LEGAL RISKS CONFRONTING STATE EMPLOYEES

Because of the prevalence of workplace personnel hazards,
maintaining a career as a state employee is not easy. The last two
decades have brought new dangers for state employees and growing
abuse of government power by state employers. 29 As the government
25. Id. § 126-35.
26. Id. § 126-35(d).
27. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 898 (N.C. 2004)
(quoting Sanders v. Parker Drilling, 911 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. See id.
29. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992); Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of
Env't & Natural Res., 664 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Corbett v. N.C. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 660 S.E.2d 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Ramsey v. N.C. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 647 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Royal v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control,
646 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Brookshire v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 637 S.E.2d
902 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Lenzer v. Flaherty, 418 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992);
Foard v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 08 CVS 21917 (Nov. 10, 2010), affg 07 O.S.P.
0135, 2008 WL 5598371 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 5, 2008); Williams v. N.C. Highway Patrol,
98 CVS 01217 (Mar. 28, 2000); Gooch v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 09 O.S.P. 2398 (Oct.
27, 2010); Raynor v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 09 O.S.P. 4648, 2010 WL
3283844 (N.C.O.A.H. July 26, 2010); Brooks v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 09 O.S.P. 5567, 2010
WL 2173482 (N.C.O.A.H. Apr. 28, 2010); Advani v. East Carolina Univ., 09 O.S.P. 1733
(Feb. 10, 2010); Bulloch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 05 O.S.P. 1178, 2010 WL
690232 (N.C.O.A.H. Jan. 15, 2010); Van Essen v. N.C. State Bd. of Cosmetic Arts, 09
B.C.A. 2772, 2010 WL 690241 (N.C.O.A.H. Jan. 2010); Nateman v. N.C. Dep't of
Cultural Res., 09 O.S.P. 1903, 2009 WL 5560377 (N.C.O.A.H. Dec. 2009); Perkins v.
N.C. Dep't of Corr., 08 O.S.P. 2242 (Sept. 17, 2009); Warren v. N.C. Dep't of Crime
Control & Public Safety, 08 O.S.P. 0212 (Apr. 17, 2009); Cassidy v. N.C. Dep't of
Transp., 08 O.S.P. 1584, 2008 WL 5510881 (N.C.O.A.H. Oct. 31, 2008); Goering v. N.C.
Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 07 O.S.P. 2256 (July 29, 2008); Burgess v. N.C.
Highway Patrol, 07 O.S.P. 0052 (July 16, 2008); Jones v. Beatty, 07 O.S.P. 2222, 2008
WL 4378246 (N.C.O.A.H. June 5, 2008); Poarch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub.
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has grown, so has the power of government employers.30 Contemporary
North Carolina public sector workplaces present vast opportunities for
management officials to employ retaliation and impose various adverse
actions.31 Recent North Carolina cases have reaffirmed many of the state
personnel problems festering in state agencies for decades, including:
retaliation,
discrimination, political patronage,33 arbitrary and
Safety, 03 O.S.P. 2004 (Sept. 17, 2007); Rivas v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 06 O.S.P. 1322,
2007 WL 2889713 (N.C.O.A.H. July 11, 2007); Hill v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control &
Pub. Safety, 04 O.S.P. 1538 (Sept. 2, 2005); Hardy v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control &
Pub. Safety, 02 O.S.P. 1670 (Apr. 24, 2003); Dietrich v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 00
O.S.P. 1039, 2001 WL 34055881 (N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 13, 2001).
30. See SAM J. ERVIN, JR., PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
SENATOR SAM ERVIN 165, 213-14 (Michie Co. 1984); JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE
DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 1-6, 49-51 (Palgrave Macmillan 1995). For cases
demonstrating just cause problems, see supra note 29.
31. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (cataloging cases
of government retaliation in different contexts). Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2002), is perhaps one of the more egregious examples of retaliation and
disparate treatment. Toomer settled a personnel claim, and the agency director
responded with direct retaliation in the form of releasing plaintiffs personnel file to the
media. Id. at 82. Many cases have reaffirmed traditional constitutional protections for
state employees. In Debnam v. N.C. Department of Corrections, 432 S.E.2d 324
(N.C. 1993), the supreme court reaffirmed traditional constitutional protections for
public employees during internal investigations. In Corum v. University of North
Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992), our supreme court issued the watershed state
constitutional decision of the 1990's. Corum reaffirmed the importance of free
expression for public employee's and held that damage remedies are available for
violations of the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 293. Corum involved retaliation
against a faculty member at Appalachian State University. Id. at 280. In Lenzer v.
Flaherty, 418 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), disc. rev. denied, 421 S.E.2d 348 (N.C.
1992), the court of appeals addressed claims under article I, sections 14 and 19 of the
North Carolina Constitution in a speech retaliation case involving a state employee.
Lenzer, a physician's assistant, was fired by her state employer, the Alcohol
Rehabilitation Center in Butner, for reporting suspected patient abuse to the State Bureau
of Investigation and the State Department of Human Resources. Id. at 278-79. The
court of appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendants on several claims
including Lenzer's free speech claim. Id. at 282-86. The court of appeals relied heavily
upon the analysis in Corum, recognizing the whistleblower theory of constitutional
protection for public employees. Id. Scores of North Carolina just cause cases
demonstrate the pervasive problems in state personnel administration. See cases cited
supra note 29.
32. E.g., Brand v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 352 F. Supp. 2d 606
(M.D.N.C. 2004) ($63,000 verdict and $50,000 in attorney fees); Newberne v. N.C.
Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 618 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. 2005); Corum, 413 S.E.2d
276.
33. E.g., Gahagan v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 2000 CVS 335 (N.C. Super. Ct., Madison
County Nov. 30, 2000).
Trooper Michael Gahagan was transferred due to his
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capricious actions, discipline without just cause," fraud and
misrepresentation," denial of procedural process, defective and
improper investigations, deprivations of privacy, refusals to comply with
agency policy,36 intentionally publicized false accusations, defamation,
physical battery, and most every other offense on the books."
New weapons are being used by bureaucrats and politicians against
North Carolina state employees. Many horror stories appear in recent
state employee terminations, especially by the North Carolina Highway
Patrol." Despite constitutional and statutory protection for the privacy
of most personnel matters, state agencies have blasted state employees in
the media, causing additional harm.40 For example, then Governor
Michael Easley publicly weighed in and commented on a pending state
employee case in Poarch v. N.C. Department of Crime Control and Public
Safety, when the Governor's office issued a press release at 9:22 p.m. on
a Sunday night proclaiming that the Governor would defy a decision by
an ALJ reinstating a state trooper."

Republican political party affiliation following a disagreement with a local Democratic
political party operative.
34. See cases cited supra note 29.
35. For one of the more frightening examples, see Foard v. N.C. Department of Crime
Control & Public Safety, 09 CVS 003519 (Nov. 10, 2010), affg 07 O.S.P. 0135, 2008 WL
5598371 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 5, 2008). Judges Hight and Webster found that highway
patrol management officials engaged in practices of misrepresentations and witness
intimidation. Id.
36. Scott v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 10 O.S.P. 1105 (Oct. 26,
2010). Judge Morrison and the commission granted summary judgment to a terminated
state trooper where the Secretary of Crime Control had violated his own agency policy
and insisted that he was not bound by his agency policy. Id.
37. In one case, Trooper Allen Williams of Columbus County was battered by his
first sergeant following a disagreement. Williams v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 98 CV 01217
(N.C. Super. Ct., Columbus County (Mar. 28, 2000). When Trooper Williams filed a
complaint about being battered, he was retaliated against by being transferred to Vance
County. Id.
38. See cases cited supra note 29.
39. E.g., Foard v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, 08 CVS 21917 (Nov. 10, 2010), affg
07 O.S.P. 0135, 2008 WL 5598371 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 5, 2008); Jones v. Beatty, 07 O.S.P.
2222, 2008 WL 4378246 (N.C.O.A.H. June 5, 2008).
40. See, e.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
41. Poarch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 03 O.S.P. 2004 (Sept. 17,
2007); see also Dan Kane, Easley: Trooper won't get job back, RALEIGH NEWS AND
OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 2007, at BI. The title of this article was misleading as there was no
evidence that Trooper Poarch had any sex on duty. The Poarch case involved an
assessment of selective enforcement of Highway Patrol personnel rules and disparate
treatment in discipline. Trooper Poarch was terminated for an off-duty extramarital
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Trooper Monty Poarch was ordered reinstated by an ALJ in light of
the egregious disparate treatment in the discipline meted out by the
Highway Patrol.42 Trooper Poarch's case was then pending before the
State Personnel Commission when the Governor's office issued its
Sunday night press release.
Secretary Bryan Beatty of the Department
of Crime Control thereafter held a staged press conference about the
pending Poarch case. The secretary also publicly released confidential
personnel information regarding twenty-four instances of patrol
discipline.
The employer instigated other efforts in Poarch to impugn Trooper
Poarch in the media with false allegations while his case was pending
before the State Personnel Commission. 6 The patrol commander wrote
a letter to the editor of the Raleigh News & Observer criticizing the
presiding judge. Poarchrepresented a new low in government abuse in
the treatment of public employees - at least until the case of Sergeant
Charles Jones of the highway patrol."
Jones v. Beatty is another of the recent state personnel cases that
have revealed evidence of high level political intermeddling and
retaliation in personnel disputes, including arbitrary gubernatorial
orders to fire employees. In Jones, senior highway patrol officials and
high level aides to then Governor Easley engaged in a process of overt
politicized retaliation against a state trooper who was falsely accused of
animal abuse.4 ' The Governor ordered that Sergeant Jones be fired
before the investigation into the alleged animal abuse was completed.o
In fact, the order was arbitrarily issued to fire Sergeant Jones before the
end of a particular business day." Secretary Beatty informed patrol
affair but numerous other employees had engaged in egregious misconduct and were not
terminated.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Raleigh News and Observer provided a number of articles covering Poarch
and other cases. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 41.
45. See Highway PatrolReleases Records Detailing Officers Punishments, WRAL NEWS,
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1 964633.
Highway
Patrol,
on
News
Conference
Bryan
Beatty
46. See
http://wral.com/news/state/video/1965765.
47. See W. Fletcher Clay, Ruling Was A Setback To Patrol Discipline, RALEIGH NEWS
AND OBSERVER, Sept. 25, 2007.
48. See Jones v. Beatty, 07 O.S.P. 2222, 2008 WL 4378246 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 22,
2010).
49. Id. (finding that the Highway Patrol failed to prove just cause for termination).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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officials that the Governor's staff wanted Sergeant Jones "gone."5
Sergeant Jones was then wrongfully fired without just cause and in
violation of his procedural due process rights." Judge Fred G. Morrison,
the State Personnel Commission, and the Wake County Superior Court
all ruled in favor of Sergeant Jones.
Jones is perhaps the most illustrative recent example of a massive
degree of overt political obstruction of justice under the State Personnel
Act. The facts were substantially undisputed, including that the
Governor ordered the unlawful termination of Jones and the end run
around the State Personnel Act. 5 The just cause provision of the State
Personnel Act provided the necessary protection from this political
scheme ordered by the Governor and carried out by his operatives.
On August 30, 2007, Sergeant Jones was served with a complaint
alleging a less-serious personal conduct violation.
On the same date,
the officer assigned to investigate the complaint, Captain Briggs, was
informed that he had until October 1, 2007 to complete his
On August 31, 2007, Captain Briggs received a
investigation.
telephone call from Major Jamie Hatcher, then Director of Special
Operations, instructing Captain Briggs that no later than 2:00 p.m. that
day Sergeant Jones was to be placed on "investigatory placement."
Later that same day, Captain Briggs was told that his investigation must
be completed that day. It was stipulated in the resulting litigation that
on or about August 31, 2007, the Governor decided that Sergeant Jones
should be dismissed from the highway patrol.6 1
Lt. Everett Clendenin, Public Information Officer for the highway
patrol, told Lt. Colonel C.E. Lockley, Deputy Commander of the

52. Order of Judge Hardin at 9, Jones, 2008 WL 4378246 (citing Transcript at 32324, Jones, 2008 WL 4378246). Then Patrol Lt. Everett Clendin informed Lt. Colonel
C.E. Lockley that "the Governor wants Jones gone." Id. at 6 (citing Transcript at 348).
Lt. Colonel Lockley testified that "he did the 'wrong thing' by approving the predetermined decision to fire Jones." Id. at 6 (citing Transcript at 337-43). Much of the
evidence is not recited in the orders, but appears in the transcript.
53. Id. at 8-9.
54. Jones, 08 CVS 21917; Jones, 2008 WL 4378246.
55. Jones, 2008 WL 4378246.
56. See id.
57. Transcript, supra note 53, at 705-06.
58. Id.
59. Transcript, supra note 53, at 707. This is to allow job temporary restructuring
during an investigation.
60. Transcript, supra note 53, at 710.
61. Jones, 2008 WL 4378246.
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highway patrol, that the Governor's press office wanted Sergeant Jones
"gone."6
On Friday, August 31, 2007, without any meaningful
investigation, Secretary Beatty suspended Sergeant Jones from the
highway patrol.6 3
On Wednesday evening, September 5, 2007, Sergeant Jones was
informed that his pre-dismissal conference was scheduled for Friday,
September 7, 2 0 0 7 .'
Later, this conference was postponed until
Saturday, September 8, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. 65 On Saturday, September 8,
2007 at 9:58 a.m., Lt. Clendenin emailed all highway patrol personnel
and forwarded them a copy of a Raleigh News & Observer article
announcing that Sergeant Jones had already been fired from the highway
patrol, notwithstanding the fact that the pre-dismissal conference had
yet to occur.66 Secretary Beatty indicated that "they wanted him gone by
the end of the business day or wanted him gone by the end of the day."6 7
Colonel Clay, commander of the Highway Patrol, recused himself
from the case and made Lt. Colonel Lockley his designee. 68 As such, it
was Lt. Colonel Lockley who officially terminated Sergeant Jones'
employment with the Highway Patrol. 69 Lt. Colonel Lockley later
testified as follows:
If the Governor's Press Office had not intervened in this matter and let
the case run its course, I would not have come to the same conclusion as
I did on September 9, 2007. It was clear to me that the outcome of
Sergeant Jones' case should be his termination from the Highway Patrol.
I arrived at this conclusion from my discussion Lieutenant Clendenin
after he had been in some discussion with the Governor's Press Office.
"They wanted him gone" were Lieutenant Clendenin's words. He
mentioned that someone in that discussion suggested that Sergeant Jones
should consider resigning.
So the decision regarding Sergeant Jones' career was predetermined not
by the Patrol's disciplinary process but by an outside entity whose
purpose was not a fair and equitable treatment of Sergeant Jones. I
received Sergeant Jones' statements, comments after his pre-dismissal
conference. I gave no consideration to any of his claims or contentions

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Transcript,
Jones, 2008
Transcript,
Id.
Jones, 2008

supra note 53, at 715.
WL 4378246.
supra note 53, at 324.
WL 4378246.
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because the ultimate outcome of his case had been predetermined. I did
not follow up ....
As far as the decision in this case to terminate Sergeant Jones, I did the
wrong thing for the right reason, protecting the agency-protecting the
agency's image.
This is the only case that has caused me any
uncertainty, and because of this matter, my personal integrity has been
compromised. I have felt this way since September 9, 2007, since I
signed the document terminating Sergeant Jones. This is totally
unacceptable to me.
The right thing to do is make a decision based on no interference from
the Governor's Press Office, no intense media scrutiny, no rush to
judgment, and no public outcry. In my opinion, the outcome would be
different because Sergeant Jones acted in the manner he was trained even
though it was an ugly manner.
I hope that all the evidence will be reviewed without bias and the factors
mentioned above. All the red flags are here to signal a great injustice has
been done to Sergeant Jones. We have an opportunity to get it right
without more embarrassment, without damaging the agency's image. I
hope we take advantage of it.70
The evidence in Jones" and Poarch' demonstrates why North
Carolina must have an effective just cause standard: to prevent career
state employees from unjustified discipline arising out of raw political
intervention and obstruction of justice. The last few years have brought
significant developments in just cause law in light of the growing abuses
of government power by North Carolina state employers.7 ' The North
Carolina Supreme Court, lower courts and administrative agencies have
responded with a series of decisions reaffirming the breadth of just cause
protections for state employees."
IV. THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE JUST CAUSE STANDARD
An effective just cause standard is necessary in order to retain a
professional and qualified state workforce. State government provides
essential core functions and services for all North Carolinians, including
such critical services as public safety, public health, public highways,

70.
71.
72.
2007).
73.
74.

Transcript, supra note 53, at 331-33.
Jones, 2008 WL 4378246.
Poarch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 03 O.S.P. 2004 (Sept. 17,
See cases cited supra note 29.
See cases cited supra note 29.
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and public education." The degree of efficiency with which these core
state services are delivered substantially determines part of the quality of
life for many North Carolinians. State law enforcement officers, school
teachers,7 t public health workers, emergency response personnel, court
personnel, transportation workers, social workers, corrections officers,
and countless others who perform the day-to-day delivery of government
services need effective just cause protection in order for the government
to properly function.
The State Personnel Act and its just cause standard were meant to
protect the jobs of career state public servants from the whim of
inappropriate discipline," by requiring state employers to justify
discipline of career state employees and to ensure that the high
threshold for determining just cause is met."
In short, an effective just cause standard is enormously important
for a number of reasons: (1) to deter political retaliation and the further
politicization of state agencies; (2) to promote positive employee morale
and esprit de corps; (3) to deter arbitrary personnel actions by state
employers; and (4) to promote consistency in personnel administration
and promote workplace justice for employees and employers. It is for
these reasons that North Carolina's personnel system requires an
effective just cause standard, applied to appropriately discipline truly
improper behaviors while also deterring management from unjustified
discipline and other misconduct. Meaningful just cause protection helps
to safeguard against arbitrariness, mistakes, errors, retaliation and other
misconduct which can deprive a state employee of his or her
employment, and also deprive the state of a valuable employee
representing a substantial financial investment by the state. An effective
just cause standard will protect this investment while at the same time
protecting the rights of government workers.
Furthermore, just cause protections promote fairness in the
workplace, which leads to employee confidence and positive morale. A
positively motivated workforce breeds and environment of collegiality,
Without meaningful just cause
efficiency and esprit de corps.
protections, erroneous decisions go unchecked. Discipline without just
cause frustrates the entire personnel system by demoralizing North

75. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 136, 143 (2010).
76. Local teachers and many other personnel are not covered by the State Personnel
Act. The statutory rights of teachers are set forth in chapter 115C, section 325 of the
North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325.
77. Id. § 126-1.
78. See id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/4

12

McGuinness: The Meaning of Just Cause in North Carolina Public Employment Law

20111

JUST CAUSE IN N.C. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAw

353

Carolina's valuable employees and rewarding abusive management
officials for their own misconduct.
V.

CARROLL: OUR SUPREME COURT'S JUST CAUSE LAW

For state employees with twenty-four continuous months of state
service, a state agency employer must prove just cause in order to
impose significant discipline," a burden outlined in section 126-35 of
the North Carolina General Statutes.so Just cause is a term of art in
public employment law, although it is not expressly defined by statute in
North Carolina." The North Carolina Administrative Code also fails to
define just cause.
Rather, courts and administrative agencies have

79. Id. §§ 126-1.1, 126-35 (covering termination, suspension, and demotion of state
employees).
80. The relevant portions of section 126-35 provide:
(a) No career state employee subject to the State Personnel Act shall be
discharged, suspended, or demoted for disciplinary reasons, except for just
cause. In cases of such disciplinary action, the employee shall, before the
action is taken, be furnished with a statement in writing setting forth in
numerical order the specific acts or omissions that are the reasons for the
disciplinary action and the employee's appeal rights. The employee shall be
permitted fifteen days from the date the statement is delivered to appeal to the
head of the department.
(d) In contested cases conducted pursuant to chapter 150B of the General
Statutes, the burden of showing that a career state employee subject to the State
Personnel Act was discharged, suspended, or demoted for just cause rests with
the department or agency employer.
Id. § 126-35(a), (d).
81. Id. § 126-35.
82. See 25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1J.0604 (2011) (providing two "bases" for just cause:
(1) unsatisfactory job performance and (2) unacceptable personal conduct); see also
Follum v. N.C. State Univ., 696 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Raynor v. N.C. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 09 O.S.P. 4648 (July 26, 2010). Title 25, chapter 1J, section
0614(h) of the North Carolina Administrative Code defines unacceptable personal
conduct as:
(1) conduct for which no reasonable person should expect to receive prior
warning; or
(2) job-related conduct which constitutes a violation of state or federal law; or
(3) convictions of a felony or an offense involving moral turpitude that is
detrimental to or impacts the employee's service to the state; or
(4) the willful violation of known or written work rules; or
(5) conduct unbecoming of state employees that is detrimental to state service;
or

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

13

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

354

[Vol. 33:341

issued decisions which have shaped the body of just cause law in North
Carolina."
The leading case is N.C. Department of Environment &
Natural Resources v. Carroll, handed down by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in 2004." As the court explained in Carroll, "Just cause,
like justice itself, is not susceptible of precise definition. It is a flexible
concept, embodying notions of equity and fairness, that can only be
determined upon an examination of the facts and circumstances of each
individual case."" Another leading state personnel case sums up the
bottom line: The law of just cause "requires that there be some
significant and meaningful violation in order for there to be just cause
for formal

disciplinary

action .

. .

. Ideally it is desired that law

enforcement officers should probably be near perfect; however, that is
not a realistic standard."8 6
In Carroll, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a
comprehensive decision clarifying the just cause principle and
expanding the breadth of just cause protection for state employees.87
Justice Mark Martin authored the unanimous decision of the court."
The court addressed several issues involving just cause and the
applicable tests for determining just cause. 9 The court also broke new
ground in several respects and enunciated an effective just cause
standard." Ultimately, Carroll reaffirmed a time honored principle from

(6) the abuse of client(s), patient(s), student(s), or a person(s) over whom the
employee has charge or to whom the employee has a responsibility or an
animal owned by the state; or
(7) absence from work after all authorized leave credits and benefits have been
exhausted; or
(8) falsification of a state application or in other employment documentation.
25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1J.0614(h).
83. See, e.g., N.C. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://www.oah.state.nc.us (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011) (describing the Office of Administrative Hearings' jurisdiction,
procedures, and published decisions).
84. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 899 (N.C. 2004).
85. Id. at 900 (quoting Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1242
(7th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
86. Dietrich v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 00 O.S.P. 1039, 2001 WL 34055881
(N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 13, 2001). Carroll relied on State ex rel Ashley v. Civil Services
Commission for Deputy Sheriffs, 395 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (W. Va. 1990), for the
proposition that just cause requires "misconduct of a substantial nature" and does not
encompass "technical violations." Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 901.
87. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 888.
88. Id. at 890.
89. Id. at 898-905.
90. Id. at 900-01.
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over one hundred years ago: The courts will be very derelict in their
duty if they do not force justice in favor of employees as well as the
public."
A. Carroll'sFactual Background
Like many personnel disputes involving North Carolina state
employees, Officer Clifton Carroll's pursuit of workplace justice became
a protracted battle where the state agency fought long and hard for six
years. The case arose from a job related incident whereby Officer
Carroll, a park ranger, was contacted on his job and informed that his
eighty-five year-old mother, a patient in a rest home Alzheimer's unit,
had collapsed and was unresponsive.
The attending nurse described
the mother's condition as "very serious."93 One week earlier, Officer
Carroll had been informed that his mother was showing signs of
congestive heart failure. 94 Officer Carroll's wife telephoned him and
informed him that he needed to call the rest home to confirm permission
to admit his mother to the hospital."
Officer Carroll was the power of attorney for his mother's health
care decisions.96 After trying unsuccessfully to reach the rest home by
phone, Officer Carroll decided that he needed to leave his work
assignment to either reach a phone where he could connect with the rest
home or drive to the rest home." Officer Carroll then quickly relayed
instructions to his staff and began the six mile drive to the state park
area where his personal vehicle was located."
Upon entering the city limits of Kure Beach, Officer Carroll found
himself in slow traffic behind a line of cars traveling bumper to
bumper. 99 In an attempt to clear the traffic, Officer Carroll engaged his
emergency flashers and dash mounted blue lights."
As the traffic
cleared and he left the Kure Beach city limits, Officer Carroll exceeded
the speed limit for approximately six-tenths of a mile by driving up to

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Greenlee v. S. Ry. Co., 30 S.E.2d 115, 116 (N.C. 1898).
Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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forty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone.'o Before
exceeding the speed limit, Officer Carroll confirmed that there was no
traffic ahead of him and there were no pedestrians or other vehicles on
either side of the road.
Officer Carroll reached the Carolina Beach State Park Office, went
inside, telephoned the rest home, and spoke with a nurse who updated
him on his mother's condition. 03 Unbeknownst to Officer Carroll, three
Carolina Beach police officers had observed him traveling with flashing
blue lights.0 4 These officers arrived at the office to inquire if Officer
Carroll needed assistance.o' They knocked on the door several times
while Officer Carroll was inside talking on the telephone with the nurse
about his mother's condition.1o' Two of the officers outside believed that
Officer Carroll shouted profanity at them while telling them to wait until
he was off the phone.'
Both officers indicated that they did not take
offense to any language used by Officer Carroll,'0o while Officer Carroll
denied using any profanity at all; a statement which was corroborated by
the nurse who he was talking with on the phone.1o' Officer Carroll
thereafter met with the officers and explained the situation to them
before they left the office."o
After the officers informed one of their superiors about the incident,
that superior believed that a complaint needed to be initiated, so he
brought the incident to the attention of Officer Carroll's supervisor."'
Subsequently, Officer Carroll was demoted from Park Ranger III to Park
Ranger II with a five-percent reduction in salary."' The employer
contended that the disciplinary action imposed upon Officer Carroll was
appropriate because he allegedly violated workplace rules and state law
in connection with his driving." 3 These simple facts began a six-year
battle over the meaning of just cause.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 891.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
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ProceduralHistory

Officer Carroll initiated a contested case petition under the State
Personnel Act alleging lack of just cause for the discipline imposed."'
The case was initially tried before Administrative Law Judge Beecher
Gray, who issued a recommended decision directing that Officer Carroll
be promoted back into his rank along with other relief because there was
no just cause for the discipline."' Thereafter, the matter was heard by
the State Personnel Commission, which unanimously adopted Judge
Gray's decision.11 6 The respondent then filed a petition for judicial
review whereby the trial court reversed the decision of the State
Personnel Commission."' Officer Carroll appealed and the court of
appeals affirmed the superior court's order."' The supreme court
allowed Officer Carroll's petition for discretionary review, unanimously
reversed the court of appeals, and remanded for reinstatement of the
decision of the State Personnel Commission in Officer Carroll's favor.119
C.

North CarolinaSupreme Court Review

The supreme court began its analysis by reviewing the North
Carolina statutory framework for administrative appeals by public
employees of disciplinary actions taken against them by their employing
state agencies. 2 0 The supreme court then conducted extensive analysis
of the standards of review applicable to administrative law cases.' 2 1 The
supreme court ultimately held that both the trial court and the court of
appeals erred in their application of the standard of review and
determination of what constitutes just cause for discipline.122 The
supreme court explained that a determination of whether a state
employer has just cause to discipline career employees requires two
separate inquiries: first, whether the employees engaged in the conduct
alleged; and second, "whether that conduct constitutes just cause for the
disciplinary action taken."'23 The court concluded that the first inquiry is

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 890; see also N.C. GEN.
Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894-97.
Id.
Id. at 898.

STAT. §

126- 35 (2010).
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a question of fact, whereas the second inquiry is a question of law.'24
Thus, the ultimate just cause determination is a question of law. 125
The court's emphasis upon analyzing the actual disciplinary action
taken reaffirms the notion that the just cause analysis is tailored to the
quantity of discipline imposed. As further explained in subsequent
cases, just cause for termination is a different standard than just cause
for lesser discipline;1 6 the "penalty" must match the "deed done by
petitioner."'2 7 Carroll's standard that the discipline imposed must be
"just" further demonstrates that there is a sliding scale of analysis where
a lower threshold for just cause applies to lesser discipline. Simply
stated, just cause for termination is a much higher standard than just
cause for demotion or suspension.
In Carroll, the supreme court also enunciated a "reasonable belief'
test for the employee.2 The court held that where a state employee has
a "reasonable belief' that his conduct was appropriate or necessary it will
ordinarily not constitute just cause for discipline.129 The adoption of this
reasonable belief test is significant in that it affords reasonable discretion
to employees, especially when confronting exigent circumstances or an
unclear policy. Many situations arise where state employees have to
make immediate judgment-call decisions. Employees also frequently
have to make decisions involving unclear agency policy. Carroll affords
deference to these employees when they have a reasonable belief that
their conduct is appropriate.o
The supreme court in Carroll also held that violations of agency
guidelines or state law do not necessarily constitute just cause for
discipline.' 3' This rule repudiated longstanding practices in some
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Gooch v. Cent. Reg'1 Hosp., 09 O.S.P. 2398 (Oct. 27, 2010) (finding
sufficient evidence for a written warning, but no just cause for termination); Raynor v.
N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 09 O.S.P 4648 (July 26, 2010); Ramsey v. N.C.
Div. Motor Vehicles, 02 O.S.P. 1623 (April 26, 2004), affd 647 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that violation of general order did not constitute just cause for
termination), disc. rev. denied, 659 S.E.2d 739 (N.C. 2008); Warren v. N.C. Dept. of
Crime Control, 2009 WL 2385453 (April 17, 2009).
127. See Raynor, 09 O.S.P. 4648.
128. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 900-02. Other areas of law apply reasonable belief tests.
See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity); Graham v. Conner,
490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force); Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782 (4th
Cir. 1998) (excessive force).
129. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 901.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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agencies that routinely imposed discipline for simple policy violations.
Under Carroll's logic, a policy violation or even a violation of law does
not necessarily rise to the required level of just cause for discipline.132
The supreme court explained that the fundamental question is whether
"the disciplinary action taken was just.' Inevitably, this inquiry requires
an irreducible act of judgment that cannot always be satisfied by the
mechanical application of rules and regulations. "133 The court again
pointed out that just cause was to be understood as a "flexible" standard,
based on notions of fairness, that should be determined based upon the
facts of the purported violation in each case.13 1
The conclusion by the supreme court that "not every violation of
law gives rise to just cause for employee discipline"13 5 is significant
because some state employers continue to contend that a violation of
policy or law absolutely constitutes just cause for discipline. The court's
reasoning demonstrates that just cause determinations are not so simple
or technical. Rather, the totality of the facts and circumstances must be
assessed using equity and fairness and balanced to a just result.136
In analyzing the evidence before it, the court sifted through many
pertinent facts and circumstances, including the officer's history,
performance, conduct, and "reasonable belief that he could treat the
emergency situation with his mother as 'one of necessity." 3 ' The court
concluded that "the evidence of record, taken as a whole, supports a
reasonable conclusion that [Officer] Carroll was motivated by his
'reasonable belief' that his conduct was necessitated by a medical
emergency."138
The court observed that although "there is no bright line test to
determine whether an employee's conduct establishes 'unacceptable
personal conduct' and thus 'just cause' for discipline, we draw guidance
from those prior cases where just cause has been found." 39 The court
then reviewed a number of cases whereby just cause findings involved

132. Id. at 900.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th
Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 901 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 903.
139. Id. at 904.
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matters "of a much more serious nature than" were involved in Carroll.1o
Thus, the court employed a comparative analysis.
Just cause determinations are not for trivial or insignificant
matters.'4 ' Rather, they are reserved for substantial violations of work
rules which are unjustified under the totality of the facts and
circumstances after the application of mitigation principles and
balancing. 4 1 Just cause for termination requires far more than a
violation of agency policy or law. Because there is no bright-line rule
from Carroll,'4 3 numerous other factors necessarily must be properly
considered, balanced and applied so that the ultimate determination
meets Carroll's test of a "just" decision. " Carroll clearly demonstrates
that just cause determinations cannot be simple or matters of technical
precision, but rather, that the totality of the facts and circumstances
must be assessed utilizing guiding principles of equity and fairness. 145
Carroll and the North Carolina Administrative Code require that
mitigating factors also be considered."'
Prior to Carroll, North Carolina law lacked lucid guidance on the
meaning of just cause. Carroll enunciated several important governing
principles that most lower courts and agencies have embraced. Carroll
represents a clarification of the law and more meaningful guidance for
employers, the State Personnel Commission, and the courts. Carroll and
the utilization of additional multi-factor tests removed just cause
determinations from a virtually subjective test to one with analytical
structure.
State employees will make mistakes, some justifiable and some
more serious. Carroll makes clear that such mistakes or even violations
of agency policy or law do not necessarily or automatically translate into
just cause for discipline. Carroll'sjust cause standard requires serious
analysis of the totality of facts and circumstances so that a meaningful
assessment of justification, the reasonable belief of the employee,
mitigation, and other elements can be determined. An analysis of lower
court personnel cases since Carroll demonstrates that Carroll has
140. Id.
141. See Dietrich v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 00 O.S.P. 1039, 2001 WL 34055881
(N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 13, 2001).
142. Id.; see also Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 900.
143. Id. at 904.
144. See id.; Hill v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 04 O.S.P. 1538 (Sept.
2, 2008); Poarch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 03 O.S.P. 2004
(September 17,2007).
145. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 900.
146. See 25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1B.0413 (2011).
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successfully made just cause law more understandable, clear, analytical,
Carroll has broad implications and will further
and functional."'
promote workplace justice in North Carolina.
VI. CARROLL'S PROGENY AND IMPLICATIONS

The Carroll tests have been routinely applied in just cause cases in
North Carolina,' 4 8 while other state regulations provide further guidance
in determining just cause for discipline. 9 There have been several
significant North Carolina appellate cases interpreting just cause since
Carroll was issued in 2004. Perhaps one of the most instructive of those
cases is Kelly v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources,
where the court of appeals addressed a case involving just cause for
discipline for off-duty conduct. 5 o The case arose out of an incident
whereby the two petitioners, long term state employees, were fishing in
the White Oak River.' 5 ' Petitioners gigged seventeen flounders and two
drums.5 2 They were stopped by a patrol boat from the Division of
Marine Fisheries,' 5 ' and Division personnel inspected the fishing coolers
on board the petitioners' vessel and inquired of petitioners if they knew
the minimum flounder size limit."' Petitioners replied that they thought
the limit was either thirteen or thirteen and one-half inches.'5 1 In fact,
the applicable flounder size regulation had recently changed from
thirteen inches to fourteen inches."' Upon inspecting the coolers, the
fisheries officers determined that twelve of the seventeen flounders were
less than fourteen inches and that two red drums had been gigged,
which was not a permitted technique for taking red drum.'

147. See Hill, 04 O.S.P. 1538; Poarch, 03 O.S.P. 2004; see also cases cited supra note
29.
148. See cases cited supra note 29.
149. For example, see title 25, section 11.0413 of the North Carolina Administrative
Code which provides that "all relevant factors and considerations" must be weighed
"including factors of mitigation." 25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1B.0413; see also Etheridge v.
N.C. Dep't of Admin., 05 O.S.P. 1771, 2006 WL 3290507 (N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 3, 2006).
150. Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 664 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
151. Id. at 627-28.
152. Id. at 628.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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The officers issued each petitioner a citation for taking six
undersized flounder and possessing one gigged red drum."' The agency
that employed the petitioners conducted an investigation, and
petitioners were subsequently charged with "unacceptable personal
conduct unbecoming a state employee that is detrimental to state
service.""' The agency imposed disciplinary suspensions for five days
without pay."'o The ALJ reversed the suspensions, finding that the
agency lacked just cause to discipline petitioners and that their
suspensions were arbitrary and capricious.'"'
The State Personnel
Commission adopted new findings of fact and conclusions of law
affirming the decision to discipline petitioners. 6 2 On judicial review, the
Wake County Superior Court found that "petitioners did not
intentionally violate the fishing laws, but rather their actions amounted
to a careless mistake; that no lasting effects arose from petitioners'
conduct; that a recurrence of petitioners' conduct was unlikely; and that
petitioners' conduct had not impaired their ability to perform their job
duties and would not adversely impact their future ability to perform
for" the agency. 6 Therefore, the superior court concluded that the
agency did not have just cause. 6 1
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court in pertinent part.165
The court applied the well-settled tests from Eury v. N.C. Employment
Security Commission166 and Carroll6 ' and concluded that the trial court
properly found that a rational nexus did not exist between the off-duty
conduct giving rise to the fishing tickets and the potential adverse
impact on petitioners' future ability to perform for the agency.16 8
In another representative case, Royal v. N.C. Department of Crime
Control, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision that

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 633.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26, 129-30.
168. Id. at 632-33 (citing N.C. Dep't of Env't & Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888,
898 (N.C. 2004); Eury v. N.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 446 S.E.2d 383, 395-96 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994), disc rev. denied, 451 S.E.2d 635 (N.C. 1994)).
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the employer lacked just cause to terminate the employee.' 69 There, the
employee was a state trooper who was fired for conduct that suggested
he was having suspicious discussions with an undercover police officer
posing as a prostitute.o70 When the superior court conducted its review,
it relied upon the employer's selective enforcement of its personnel rules
and disparate treatment in discipline.' 7 '
The disparate treatment
militated against a finding of just cause. The reinstatement of the
trooper was upheld on appeal.7 2
In Follum v. North Carolina State University, the court of appeals
addressed a termination case arising out of the petitioner's
communication, conduct, and treatment of others.'17
After written
warnings for the conduct at issue, the conduct continued."
Subsequently, serious performance problems were discovered, and
termination followed.'17 The employee challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence as being insufficient to establish just cause for termination.' 76
The court of appeals applied the Carroll standard and concluded that the
employee's conduct rose to the level required for just cause.1
Other appellate cases have carved out additional just cause
principles. An example of the heavy burden that an employer must
carry in a just cause case appears in Walker v. N.C. Department of Human
Resources." There, employees were discharged because they did not
meet standards for productivity set by their supervisor during a
probationary period.'17 The court concluded that when an agency seeks
to establish just cause, "it cannot rest solely on the grounds that a
supervisor's directives were not carried out to their fullest extent.""s
The evidence demonstrated that each employee had improved during the
probationary period, and that they were behind in certain areas such as

169. Royal v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control, No. COA06-756, 2007 WL 1928684, at *3
(N.C. Ct. App. July 3, 2007).
170. Id. at*1.
171. Royal v. Dep't of Crime Control, No. 03 CV 015891, 2006 WL 4228219 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Wake County Mar. 28, 2006).
172. Royal, 2007 WL 1928684, at *4.
173. Follum v. N.C. State Univ., No. COAO9-1466, 2010 WL 2163782 (N.C. Ct. App.
June 1, 2010).
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *6-8.
178. Walker v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 397 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Id. at 352.
180. Id. at 355.
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paperwork due to extraneous forces such as under-staffing and a fire in
the office.'"' The evidence also established that each employee was
putting in extra efforts to meet the supervisor's requirements.' 2 In
affirming the decision of the superior court to reverse the discharges, the
court of appeals articulated the heightened burden that the employer
must establish:
In attempting to establish that it had just cause to terminate an
employee ... an agency is bound to make a showing that the employee
has not performed with reasonable care, diligence and attention. Failure
to fulfill certain quotas and complete certain tasks to the complete
satisfaction of a supervisor is not enough. The agency must show that
these quotas and job requirements were reasonable, and if so, that the
employee made no reasonable effort to meet them.8 3
Ultimately, Walker demonstrates that unreasonable employer conduct
militates against a finding of just cause.
Many cases have established that an employer's decision to
discipline an employee must be supported by "substantial evidence."'
Our courts have recognized that "[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."8 It is "more than a scintilla or a permissible inference."1
In order to establish justification for the disciplinary action through
substantial evidence, the employer cannot "cherry pick" the facts upon
which it relies, but must take into account contradictory evidence or
evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn."' For
example, in Wiley v. N.C. Department of Health and Human Services, the
employee, a nursing assistant, was accused of slapping a patient.8 8 The
agency concluded that the employee had slapped the patient, based

181. Id. at 354-55.
182. Id. at 355.
183. Id.; see also Gainey v. N.C. Dep't of Justice, 465 S.E.2d 36, 41 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996).
184. E.g., Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1981);
Teague v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 628 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Mendenhall v.
N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 459 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Kandler v. Dep't of
Corr., 342 S.E.2d 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
185. Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 233 S.E.2d 538, 544 (N.C. 1977)
(internal citations omitted).
186. Id.; see also Wiggins v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 413 S.E.2d 3, 5 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992).
187. Wiley v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. COAO2-169, 2002 WL
31895023, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002).
188. Id. at *1.
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primarily on statements provided by two other employees.'8 9 However,
the statements and testimony of those employees proved inconsistent. 0
Furthermore, those employees testified that the patient was slapped so
hard by the petitioner that the slap "echoed" or was "very loud and it
rang.""' However, the evidence revealed that the patient had pale skin
and that she bruised often and easily, but on this occasion there were no
visible signs of bruising or abuse.' 92 This evidence was ignored by the
employer.'9 3 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the
contradictory evidence must be taken into account by the employer, and
where that is not done, just cause is not established.'9 4 As the court
explained, "[tihe accusing witnesses would have the agency believe that
an elderly women [sic] with pale, quick-to-bruise skin, was slapped so
hard that the slap echoed but no visible signs resulted. It is simply
unfathomable that some mark, however slight, would not have been
visible after such a riveting slap." 95
Carroll's just cause test requires a broad analysis of all facts and
factors that relate to whether the discipline is just. The requirement of
mitigation is expressly codified in title 25, section 1B.0413 of the North
Carolina Administrative Code, which provides that "all relevant factors
and circumstances" must be weighed "including factors of mitigation."o196
This regulation reaffirms the core principles of Carroll.'1
VII. THE SEVEN FACTOR ENTERPRISE WIRE JUST CAUSE TEST
Because Carroll found that there is no bright-line test for just cause,
various factors and tests have been utilized to determine whether
government employers have proven just cause for discipline. In 1966,
Arbitrator Carol Daugherty articulated the most frequently cited
formulation of the concept of what has come to be called "the seven tests

189. Id.
190. Id. at *4.
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id. at *4.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id. at *4.
196. 25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1B.0413 (2011); see also Etheridge v. N.C. Dept. of
Admin., 05 O.S.P. 1771, 2006 WL 3290507 (N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 3, 2006); Dietrich v. N.C.
Highway Patrol, 00 O.S.P. 1039, 2001 WL 34055881 (N.C.O.A.H. Aug. 13, 2001).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26, 129-30.
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of just cause."'" The North Carolina State Personnel Commission has
recognized and applied this seven factor test. "
The following seven questions are posed in determining whether
there is just cause for discipline:
(1) Did the employer provide the employee forewarning or
foreknowledge of the possible or probable disciplinary consequences of
the employee's conduct?
(2) Was the employer's rule or managerial order reasonably related to
a) the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the employer's business and
b) the performance that the employer might properly expect of the
employee?
(3)
Did the employer, before administering discipline to the employee,
make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or
disobey the rule or order of the employer?
(4)

Was the employer's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?

At the investigation, did the "judge" obtain substantial evidence or
(5)
proof that the employee was guilty as charged?
(6) Whether the employer applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees?
(7)

Was the degree of discipline administered by the employer in a

particular case reasonably related to a) the seriousness of the employee's

proven offense and b) the record of the employee in his service with the
employer? 20

An answer of "no" to any one or more of the seven questions normally
signifies that just cause does not exist. 201
In Burgess v. N.C. Highway Patrol, Judge Beecher Gray and the
North Carolina State Personnel Commission applied this seven factor
just cause test. 20 2 In Foard v. N.C. Department of Crime Control and
Public Safety, Superior Court Judge Henry Hight adopted Judge Joe

198. See In re Enterprise Wire Co., 46 L.A. 359 (1966). An entire treatise on
discipline and discharge is structured around Arbitrator Daugherty's seven tests. See
KOVEN AND SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS (May Rev. 3d ed. 2006).
199. E.g., Bulloch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 05 O.S.P. 1178, 2010
WL 690232 (N.C.O.A.H. Jan. 15, 2010); Burgess v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 07 O.S.P. 0052
(July 16, 2008).
200. Enterprise Wire, 46 L.A. 359.
201. See Roger 1. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of 'Just Cause" in
Employee DisciplineCases, 85 DUKE L.J. 594 (1985). This article was approvingly cited in
Carroll. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 2004).
202. Burgess, 07 O.S.P. 0052.
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Webster's reliance upon this test.2 03 Furthermore, in Bulloch v. N.C.
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, the ALJ and the North
Carolina State Personnel Commission applied this test.2 04 Through these
decisions, the seven-factor Enterprise Wire test clearly emerged as the
leading analytical model to be used in implementing Carroll in North
Carolina.2 05
Of particular importance, the sixth EnterpriseWire factor is whether
the employer has consistently applied the work rule in question to other
employees.2 06 Where the evidence demonstrates that the employer has
selectively enforced its work rule or has imposed disparate treatment in
discipline, this factor militates against a finding of just cause.0 North
Carolina State Personnel Policy expressly provides that state agency

203. Foard v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 09 C.V.S. 003519 (Nov. 10,
2010), affg 07 O.S.P. 0135, 2008 WL 5598371 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 5, 2008).
204. Bulloch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 05 O.S.P. 1178, 2010 WL
690232 (N.C.O.A.H. Jan. 15, 2010).
205. In Hill v. N.C. Department of Crime Control, Administrative Law Judge Chess
employed a slightly different multi-faceted set of factors in determining whether there
was just cause to terminate a state trooper. These factors necessitate a broad review of a
number of sub-factors, which include:
(1) The employee's training and education on the relevant points of inquiry;
(2) The employee's history on the relevant points of inquiry including the state
employee's quantity of experience;
(3) Whether the conduct is isolated or a part of a pattern or practice of the
employee;
(4) The motivation of the agency in the termination including whether there
was any improper considerations;
(5) Was the employee involved in good faith whistleblowing of possible
misconduct or other good faith motivations;
(6) Was the employee under any duress or coercion that may have contributed
to his or her conduct;
(7) Was the employee motivated by any improper personal self gain;
(8) Any other significant mitigating factors.
These factors were tailored to the particulars of Hill, but appear to be analytically helpful
in considering Carroll'sbroad standard of whether the discipline was just. Hill and other
cases following Carrolldemonstrate the broad totality of circumstances test that warrants
consideration of various factors in determining just cause.
206. In re Enterprise Wire Co., 46 L.A. 359 (1966). The other just cause tests,
including the North Carolina State Personnel Manual, also apply the selective
enforcement and disparate treatment principle. Disparate treatment and selective
enforcement issues are further addressed infra.
207. Id.
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employers have a duty to consider evidence of disparate treatment in
discipline." In Mims v. N.C. Sheriffs Commission, the court explained:
Recent cases demonstrate and reaffirm fundamental requirements that
there must be uniform rules for consistent application to everyone
including law enforcement officers. 209
The disparate treatment and selective enforcement principles are helpful
in illustrating the employer's actual employment practices regarding the
work rule in issue.
A leading national scholar and practitioner has suggested the
following factors may be considered in determining just cause: 210
1. Has the government factually proven the charges by a preponderance
of the evidence?
2. Was the imposed punishment proportionate in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case?
3. Did the employer conduct a thorough investigation?
4. Were other employees who engaged in conduct similar to that of the
employee treated as harshly by the employer?
5. Was the employee's misconduct the product of action or inaction by
the employer?
6. Did the employer take into consideration the employee's good or
exemplary work history?
7. Did the employer take into consideration mitigating circumstances?
8. Was the employee subjected to progressive or corrective discipline?
9. Was the employer motivated by anti-union bias?
10. Are the employer's rules clear and understandable?
11. Is the employee likely to engage in similar conduct in the future?
12. Was the employee afforded
disciplinary investigation?

procedural

due process

in the

The foregoing factors provide similar themes of analysis as provided by

EnterpriseWire and Hill.
208. E.g., STATE PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 203, § 7, at 11; see also Poarch v. N.C.
Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 03 O.S.P. 2004 (Sept. 17, 2007).
209. Mims v. N.C. Sheriffs Comm'n, 02 D.OJ. 1263, 2003 WL 22146102
(N.C.O.A.H. June 3, 2003) (citing Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. App. 2002)).
210. See Will Aitchison, The Rights of Police Officers 99-101 (6th ed. 2009). Mr.
Aitchison has taught just cause and other public personnel law around the country for
decades. His treatises are known as the "bible" of public employment law.
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The North Carolina State Personnel Manual similarly provides a list
of factors for analysis including:
(1) Whether the supervisor should recommend disciplinary action
based on the facts.
(2)

Whether more investigation is needed to make a recommendation.

(3)

The type and degree of disciplinary action to be taken.

(4)

The employee's work history.

(5) The disciplinary actions received by other employees within the
agency/work unit for comparable performance or behaviors.
(6)

Other relevant factors.2 1

The sixth provision affords broad latitude for consideration of other unenumerated factors.
VIII.OFF-DUTY CONDUCT ANDJUST CAUSE

As discussed above, government employers can, and routinely do
discipline state employees for conduct away from the workplace,
wielding a power not possessed by most of their private sector
counterparts. Under what circumstances and to what extent can a state
employer impose discipline for off-duty conduct? Discipline for off-duty
conduct may be proper where the employer can prove a clear
relationship between the off-duty conduct and the employer's legitimate
interests.2 12 The critical component in finding just cause for discipline
based on off-duty conduct is the employer's proof of a rational nexus
between the off-duty conduct and the employer's legitimate interest.213
Constitutional privacy and related principles generally preclude
governmental employers from overreaching into the private lives of
employees. 1
North Carolina cases have recognized a special set of analytical
rules in state employee cases, as well as a nexus test when the alleged
misconduct occurs off-duty. In Eury, the court of appeals addressed a

211. STATE PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 203, § 7, at 11.
212. Eury v. N.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 446 S.E.2d 383, 395-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994),
disc rev. denied, 451 S.E.2d 635 (N.C. 1994)).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Littlejohn v. Rose, 768
F.2d 765, 770-71 (6th Cir. 1985); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468-71
(9th Cir. 1983).
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state employee termination case premised upon off-duty misconduct.2 15
The Eury test was re-affirmed by Kelly. 16
In Eury, the employees were caught growing marijuana and were
fired.217 They pled to the misdemeanor charge of maintaining a vehicle
for the transportation of a controlled substance in violation of
section 90-108(a)(7) of the North Carolina General Statutes. 18 The ALJ
found that there was no just cause for termination.2 19 The State
Personnel Commission adopted some but not all of the ALJ's findings
and found just cause.220 The superior court then agreed with the original
finding of the ALJ, and found no just cause for termination. 22 ' The court
of appeals ultimately remanded the case after setting forth an analytical
test with factors to address in off-duty state personnel cases.222
The court of appeals held that "the agency must demonstrate that
the dismissal is supported by the existence of a rational nexus between
the type of criminal conduct committed and the potential adverse impact
on the employee's future ability to perform for the agency." "22 The court
of appeals explained:
[1It is well established that administrative agencies may not engage in
arbitrary and capricious conduct ... . Accordingly, we hold that in cases
in which an employee has been dismissed based upon an act of off-duty
criminal conduct, the agency must demonstrate that the dismissal is
supported by the existence of a rational nexus between the type of
criminal conduct committed and the potential adverse impact on the
employee's future ability to perform for the agency .

..

In determining

whether a rational nexus exists, the Commission may consider the
following factors:
- the degree to which, if any, the conduct may have adversely
affected clients or colleagues;
- the relationship between the type of work performed by the
employee for the agency and the type of criminal conduct
committed;

215.
216.
2008).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Eury, 446 S.E.2d 383.
Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 664 S.E.2d 625, 632 (N.C. Ct. App.
Eury, 446 S.E.2d at 385-86.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id. at 395-96.
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- the likelihood of recurrence of the questioned conduct and the
degree to which the conduct may affect work performance, work
quality, and the agency's good will and interests ...
- the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct to the
commencement of the disciplinary proceedings;
- the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding
the conduct;
- the blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of the motives resulting
in the conduct; and
- the presence or absence of any relevant factors in mitigation.
Although we now recommend certain factors which could be considered
by the Commission in employing the rational nexus test, we caution that
no list of factors should be viewed as all-inclusive. 224
These Eury factors provide substantial criteria for analysis in each case,
to be analyzed in conjunction with the tests enunciated by Carroll.
These factors demonstrate that there is a heightened standard for the
determination of just cause in off-duty conduct cases as compared with
more traditional on-duty conduct cases.
IX. THE LEADING TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
MAGNITUDE OF DISCIPLINE

When just cause for discipline is properly found, how should an
agency properly determine the appropriate level of discipline? Carroll
held that the disciplinary action must be just.22 5 This requires that
discipline be commensurate with the magnitude of the offense, 2 6 while
taking into consideration a number of specific factors.

In Douglas v. Veterans' Administration,22 7

the Merit Systems

Protection Board enunciated the following factors for application in
determining the appropriateness of punishment:

224. Id.
225. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 900 (N.C. 2004).
226. Raynor v. N.C. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs, 09 O.S.P. 4648, 2010 WL
3283844 (N.C.O.A.H. July 26, 2010); Ramsey v. N.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 647
S.E.2d 125 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
227. Douglas v. Veterans' Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 329-32 (1981). The Douglas test
has been widely followed for thirty years. See Isidore Silver, Public Employee Discharge
and Discipline (3d ed. 2001) (reviewing just cause for discipline in chapter three). This
treatise was approvingly cited in Carroll. See Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 900.
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1. The nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the
employee's duties, position and responsibilities, including whether the
offense was intentional, technical or inadvertent, or was committed
maliciously or for gain or was frequently repeated.
2. The employee's job level and type of employment, including
supervisory role, contacts with the public and prominence of the
position.
3. The employee's past disciplinary record.
4. The employee's past work record including length of service,
performance on the job, ability to get along with fellow workers and
dependability.
5. The effect of the offense upon the employee's ability to perform at a
satisfactory level and its effect upon the supervisor's confidence in the
employee's ability to perform.
6. The consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other
employees for the same or similar offenses.
7. The impact of the penalty upon the agency's reputation.
8. The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the reputation of the
agency.
9. The clarity with which the employee was aware of any rules that
were violated in committing the offense or have been warned about the
conduct in question.
10. The potential for the employee's rehabilitation.
11. The presence of mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense
such as unusual job tension, personality problems, mental impairment,
harassment or bad faith, malice or provocation on the part of others
involved in the matter.
12. The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such
conduct in the future.
The foregoing factors have long been recognized as appropriate tools of
analysis in determining a just disciplinary penalty. Carroll's "just"
standard provides for commensurate discipline.2 2 8

228. See, e.g., Raynor, 2010 WL 3283844 ("[T]he penalty of dismissal does not match
the deed done by petitioner."); Ramsey, 647 S.E.2d 125 ("[Dismissal under these facts
would be a miscarriage of the principles of fairness for this petitioner . . . .").
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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH AGENCY RULES AS A LACK OF JUST CAUSE

Another recognized basis to show lack of just cause involves a state
agency employer's lack of compliance with its own rules. A line of cases
holds that governmental representations made in a public employer's
ordinances, personnel policies, and handbooks must be "scrupulously"
adhered to.2 29 Where government employment is premised upon "a
defined procedure .

.

. that procedure must be scrupulously observed."a

Vitarelli v. Seaton reinforced the rule that governmental employers must
comply with applicable departmental regulations."'
In short,
governmental employers must play by their own rules.
The State Personnel Commission, administrative agencies and
numerous courts have held that governmental employers must comply
with their own rules and that non-compliance by agencies with their
own rules constitutes a separate ground for relief.23 2 In Dietrich v. N.C.
Highway Patrol,Judge Gray explained as follows:
As an alternative ground for not imposing formal discipline in this case,
the Patrol has failed to comply with its own regulations....
Governmental employers must comply with their own regulations. See
United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1970), where the
Fourth Circuit included a thoughtful discussion of Shaughnessy and
other United States Supreme Court cases which stand for this central
proposition. The Court observed that in Shaughnessy that [sic] the
Supreme Court vacated a governmental decision because the procedure
leading to the order did not conform to the relevant regulations. The
failure of the board and of the Department of Justice to follow their own
established procedures was held a violation of due process. The Accardi
Doctrine was subsequently applied by the Supreme Court in Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1959), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959),
to vacate the discharges of government employees. These principles

229. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); S.E.C. v. Cherry, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1942).
230. Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 546.
231. Id.; see also Beacom v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 500 F. Supp.
428 (D. Ariz. 1980) (holding that public employees must be accorded benefit of agency
regulations.); accord Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
state legislation which provides for particular procedural protection constitutes an
entitlement protectable through the Due Process Clause); Derrickson v. Bd. of Educ.,
703 F.2d 390, 315 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that public employer's failure to follow its
own regulations may unconstitutionally deprive employees of property interest).
232. E.g., Dietrich v. N.C. Highway Patrol, No. 00 O.S.P. 1039, 2001 WL 34055881
(N.C.O.A.H. August 13, 2001).
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have been cited as applicable in contemporary public employee
constitutional litigation in North Carolina. 233
The State Personnel Commission has recently reaffirmed the rule
providing that "there is an alternative ground for not imposing formal
discipline where an agency fails to comply with its own policy."234
In United States v. Heffner, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed that the Supreme Court vacated a governmental personnel
decision in Accardi v. Shaughnessy because "the procedure leading to the
order did not conform to the relevant regulations. The failure of the
board and of the Department of Justice to follow their own established
procedures was held a violation of due process."23 In Heffner, the court
explained:
An agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules,
regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do
so, its actions cannot stand and courts will strike it down. This doctrine
was announced in United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. . . . These

cases are consistent with the doctrine's purpose to prevent the
arbitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency's violation of
its own procedures.236
These cases demonstrate that governmental rule compliance is a
fundamental requirement for just cause for discipline.
XI. DISPARATE TREATMENT AND SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT PRECLUDE A
FINDING OF JUST CAUSE

Even when just cause for discipline could otherwise be properly
determined, and the offending employee is clearly guilty of some
misconduct, disparate treatment of offending employees within the
agency can preclude a finding of just cause. The last several decades of
public employment law have generated hundreds of cases demonstrating
that disparate treatment in discipline and selective enforcement of
personnel rules are substantial problems that adversely affect public
personnel administration.
Disparate treatment and selective
enforcement are among the factors to be addressed in just cause cases
233. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
234. Bulloch v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 05 O.S.P. 1178, 2010 WL 690232, at *38
(N.C.O.A.H. Jan. 15, 2010) (citing Dietrich,2001 WL 34055881).
235. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969) ("The Accardi
doctrine was subsequently applied by the Supreme Court in Service v. Dulles . . . and
Vitarrelli v. Seaton . . . to vacate the discharges of government employees." (internal
citations omitted)); see also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 535 (1959).
236. Heffner, 420 F.2d at 811-12.
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under the Enterprise Wire237 and other analytical tests. A number of
North Carolina just cause cases have been predicated upon findings of
disparate treatment and selective enforcement.m
The following cases were mostly decided on equal protection
grounds and are addressed herein to illustrate the underpinnings of the
doctrine of disparate treatment. These cases remain helpful for disparate
treatment analysis in just cause cases, and the application of the Carroll
and other relevant factors and tests.
In Toomer v. Garrett, the court of appeals recognized disparate
treatment claims in a records dispute involving a former state
employee.2 9 Toomer settled an employment claim with his former
employer, the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles.24 0 Following
his settlement, the secretary of the Department of Transportation
retaliated by releasing Toomer's personnel records directly to the news
media.2 4 ' Toomer's files were dumped out to the press, but the files of
Thus, Toomer's
other employees who had settled cases were not. 4
constitutional disparate treatment claim was upheld, which afforded him
a second recovery. 4 3
Among the leading selective enforcement cases in the public
employment context is Ziegler v. Jackson.2" In Ziegler, the Fifth Circuit
reversed summary judgment and imposed judgment as a matter of law
for a police officer who was terminated due to his misdemeanor criminal
convictions for presenting a firearm and criminal provocation."' Three
other officers were retained, despite their convictions for assault and
forgery. 24 6 The criminal charges were different, but the pattern of
conduct illustrated the selective enforcement of the personnel rules."

237. In re Enterprise Wire Co., 46 L.A. 359 (1966).
238. See, e.g., Royal v. N.C. Highway Patrol, No. COAO6-756, 2007 WL 1928684
(N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Bulloch, 2010 WL 690232; Poach v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 03
O.S.P. 2004 (Sept. 17, 2007); Foard v. N.C. Highway Patrol, 09 CVS 003519, affg 07
O.S.P. 0135, 2008 WL 5598371 (N.C.O.A.H. Nov. 5, 2008).
239. Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 88-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), disc. rev. denied,
579 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 2003).
240. Id. at 82.
241. Id. at 82-83.
242. Id. at 89.
243. Id.; see also Mims v. N.C. Sheriffs Comm'n, 02 DOJ 1263, 2003 WL 22146102
(N.C.O.A.H. June 3, 2003).
244. Ziegler v. Jackson, 638 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1981).
245. Id. at 780.
246. Id. at 779.
247. See id. at 779-80.
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Ziegler prevailed as a matter of law.1 8 Ziegler is often followed in cases
involving public employers; these other cases are in accord."' Ziegler
and other cases demonstrate how an employee can be culpable of some
wrongdoing, yet still be subject to the benefit of the disparate treatment
principle.
In Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, the plaintiff employee misused and
misappropriated his employer's property and employees for personal
gain."' The plaintiff used a city vehicle to deliver mulch to his home
and used city employees to do personal jobs for him. 5 The plaintiff was
subsequently fired.5
In reversing the trial court and reinstating the
plaintiffs verdict, the Fourth Circuit explained:
In contrast to the treatment dealt Abasiekong, it appears that several
white City employees enjoyed with complete impunity and some
regularity the use of City vehicles and resources for personal activities.
Here is the crux of our decision favoring Abasiekong. Had no disparate
treatment favoring whites been established, the impropriety of diversion
of public property to private use and enjoyment would doubtless have
justified the termination of Abasiekong's employment. 5
The plaintiff was obviously culpable of significant wrongdoing, yet he
prevailed because of the disparate treatment.25 4
The plaintiff misused a city truck and had town employees perform
personal work for him on separate occasions.' 5
However, other
employees misused city vehicles and resources for personal activities.256
The dispositive point in Abasiekong is that various employees had
violated the same policy, the details of which likely differed, but one was
fired and others were not. 257 Abasiekong has been recognized by leading

248. Id. at 780.
249. See Olschock v. Vill. of Skokie, 541 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that
differential discipline violates equal protection if there is a showing of intentional or
purposeful discrimination); Massey v. Inland Boatmen's Union, 886 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1989). Equal protection claims have been stated where it was alleged that some were
subjected to arbitrary denial of hearing procedures while others were not. E.g., Stringer
v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).
250. Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1056 (4th Cir. 1984).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1056.
256. Id. at 1057.
257. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/4

36

McGuinness: The Meaning of Just Cause in North Carolina Public Employment Law

2011]

JUST CAUSE IN N.C. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW

377

commentators as representing the principle that "unequal discipline" can
establish disparate treatment.
In Ciechon v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed a
personnel dispute whereby the plaintiff, a paramedic, was fired as a
result of alleged mistreatment of a patient on an ambulance run.259
However, Ciechon and her partner paramedic, Ritt, were equally
responsible for the welfare of a patient.260 However, Ciechon was fired
and Ritt was not punished at all.2 6' The court's decision was grounded
upon the fact that the defendants chose one of the two employees for
disparate treatment.
Since 1944, the Supreme Court has recognized selective
enforcement even where there is no special protected class.263 in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, the Supreme Court addressed a termination
case whereby a substantial number of employees were jointly charged
with theft. 264 These employees had misappropriated cargo from one of
the company's shipments.26 ' Two of the employees were discharged, but
another who committed the same offense was not discharged.266 The
Court reasoned that even participation in serious misconduct or crime

258. See 2 KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII ACTIONS § 19.23 at 146
(Wiley Law Publ'ns 1994). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, the Supreme Court addressed
a termination case whereby a substantial number of employees were jointly charged with
theft. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
These employees had
misappropriated cargo from one of the company's shipments. Id. at 273. Two of the
employees were discharged, but another who committed the same offense was not
discharged. Id. The Court reasoned that even participation in serious misconduct or
crime does not allow an employer to escape from the disparate treatment principle. Id. at
283-84.
259. Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
260. Id. at 522.
261. Id. at 515-16.
262. Id. at 524.
263. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944). However, the Supreme Court
retreated in Engquist v. Oregon, 553 U.S. 591 (2008), where the Court held that federal
equal protection did not extend to cover the particular facts therein of a class of one
discrimination grounded in federal equal protection law. However, Engquist has no
application to just cause cases under the State Personnel Act, which has different
elements and standards. North Carolina recognizes the use of non-suspect class equal
protection for public employees under the North Carolina Constitution. See also Toomer
v. Garrett, 574 S.E. 2d 76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
264. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
265. Id. at 273.
266. Id.
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does not allow an employer to escape from the disparate treatment
principle.267
Many victims of disparate treatment have substantial levels of
culpability for committing offenses. For example, in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, the plaintiff engaged in unlawfully activity.268 There, the
plaintiff engaged in illegal activity consisting of a "stall in" where he
participated in blocking access into the employer's premises.269 The
plaintiffs conduct was criminal and he plead guilty to a criminal
charge.27 0 The Supreme Court concluded that even his illegal activities
did not preclude him from the benefit of the disparate treatment
principle and the Supreme Court remanded the case for retrial.2 7 1
These cases provide a solid foundation of precedent for the
disparate treatment rule, and are applicable in just cause analysis under
EnterpriseWire2 72 and other multi-factor tests.
XII. CONCLUSION
Most of North Carolina's state employees work to make life better
for the rest of us. Many state employees make mistakes in carrying out
the challenging day-to-day delivery of government services. The just
cause standard requires much more than mechanical determinations of
policy or law violations in order to impose discipline. Rather, the just
cause standard requires a broad and probative analytical assessment of a
wide range of factors and considerations with a goal of reaching a just
result under the totality of the particular facts and circumstances.
Although Carroll did not attempt to enunciate a clear, bright-line
rule for just cause, Carroll enunciated the core guiding analytical
267. Id. at 283-84.
268. McDonnel Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 795.
271. Id. at 804-07. The disparate treatment rule also applies to dancing in public
facilities. In Willis v. Town of Marshal,426 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit
applied the disparate treatment doctrine in an interesting case where Rebecca Willis'
provocative dancing was questioned by the mayor. Ms. Willis was issued an order that
she could no longer dance in the social function building in the Town of Marshal. Id. at
254. Despite the fact that the court ruled against Ms. Willis on numerous constitutional
theories including First Amendment and Due Process claims, the court reversed the trial
court and remanded the disparate treatment claims for trial. Id. at 267. Even if Ms.
Willis had engaged in misconduct by lewd or suggestive dancing in a public facility, she
could not be singled out for disparate treatment and punishment because her dance
partner was not thrown out. Ultimately, this case was settled for $275,000.00.
272. In re Enterprise Wire Co., 46 L.A. 359 (1966).
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principles establishing a solid foundation of just cause protection for
state employees.2 73 The Carroll standard, coupled with Enterprise Wire
or other multi-factor tests, provides ample guidance for lower tribunals
to decide these important cases. Justice Martin's brilliant scholarship
crafted a clear opinion which has become a major positive development
in public employment jurisprudence.
Carroll's progeny demonstrates that Carroll'sjust cause protections
are meaningful and broad. 274 North Carolina's specialized ALJs and the
State Personnel Commission have further refined and improved just
cause analysis through the application of the Enterprise Wire27 5 and
Hill 27 6 analytical factors.
As a result of Carroll and its progeny, state agencies and employees
are able to better understand what just cause means and what analytical
tests will be applied in reaching just cause decisions. Fine public
servants like Sergeant Jones and many others have had a better day in
court because of the Carroll standard. North Carolina state workplaces
are safer and more efficient because Officer Carroll had the good
judgment to challenge unjustified discipline, which resulted in a
clarified and vastly improved legal standard of just cause. Officer Carroll
reacted as any rational person would have to the trauma involving his
mother, but was met with employer action that was anything but
rational. North Carolina's ALJs, the State Personnel Commission, and
courts will continue to fulfill the crucial import of Carroll by reaching a
just result after a proper and complete analytical assessment is
conducted. Then, workplace justice may be achieved for everyone.

273. See N.C. Dep't of EnV't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 2004).
274. See, e.g., Follum v. N.C. State Univ., No. COA 09-1466, 2010 WL 2163782 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2010); Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of EnVt & Natural Res., 664 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008); Royal v. N.C. Highway Patrol, No. COA06-756, 2007 WL 1928684 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2007).
275. Enterprise Wire, 46 LA 359.
276. Hill v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 04 O.S.P. 1538 (Sept. 2,
2005).
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